



















Abstract: Around one million people are killed world wide every year in road-traffic 
accidents. The risks and consequences of accidents increase progressively with speed, which 
ultimately is determined by the individual driver. The behaviour of the motorist thus affects 
both her own and other peoples safety. Internalisation of external costs of road transport has 
hitherto been focused on distance-based taxes or insurance premiums. While these means, as 
they are designed today, may affect driven distance, they have no influence on driving 
behaviour. This paper argues that by linking on-board positioning systems to insurance 
premiums it is possible to reward careful driving and get drivers to self select into different 
risk categories depending on their compliance to speed limits. We report two economic field 
experiments that have tested ways to induce car-owners to have technical platforms installed 
in their vehicle in order to affect the extent of speeding. It is demonstrated that a bonus to 
remunerate those that have the device installed, tantamount to a lower insurance premium, 
increases drivers’ propensity to accept the technical devices. In a second experiment the size 
of the bonus is made dependent on the actual frequency of speeding. We find that this is a 
second way to discipline users to drive at legal speeds.  
 
Key-words: Traffic safety, impure public goods, moral hazard, adverse selection, self 
selection. 
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1. Introduction 
More than 20 million people are severely injured or killed on the world’s roads each year, and 
the burden falls most heavily on developing countries, where it will grow heavier still because 
of the rapid increase in the number of vehicles (WHO 2004). A recent estimate of benefits 
from safety enhancing electronic equipment in motor vehicles is based on that accident costs 
may add up to about 2 percent of GDP in many countries (OECD 2003).  
 
Accidents appear both because of chance and of illicit behaviour. Moreover, their 
consequences fall both on those behaving improperly and on the non culpable. In view of the 
enormous costs, it is no wonder that internalisation of external cost of transport since long is 
high on the transport policy agenda. Surcharges on fuel are used to internalise otherwise 
external costs, and much effort has been directed to calculate the (external) cost to society 
generated by additional distances driven; except for accidents this includes congestion, 
environmental costs and road wear and tear (cf. Nash & Mattews forthcoming). The rationale 
for using fuel as a basis for a Pigou tax for internalisation of accident costs is that the more a 
vehicle is driven, the more fuel is used and the larger is the risk that it ends up in an accident.  
 
But parameters other than distance may be equally or more important for understanding 
variations in accident risks and in external accident costs. In this paper we are concerned with 
speed as an important explanation of accident risks; the higher the speed, the higher is the risk 
for getting involved in, and the more severe is the consequence of, an accident. In addition, 
the higher the speed of a particular vehicle, the higher is the accident risk for meeting or 
bypassed vehicles. The choice of speed, or the frequency of speeding, may also be collinear 
with other behavioural driving patterns related to accident risks, such as dangerous 
overtaking. Fuel charges are a much too blunt an instrument for handling this dimension of 
accident externalities. 
 
Traffic safety is a public good in that one person’s safe driving will benefit all vehicles in a 
traffic system. The individual will however choose speed by balancing his or her own safety 
against the private costs of arriving sooner or later to a destination, without necessarily taking 
the benefits to others of safe driving into account. As we will show below, the driver takes 
part in a prisoners-dilemma form of social interaction with other road users in their choice of   3
speed. Traffic safety will therefore be underprovided compared to a socially efficient 
outcome.  
 
To discipline drivers into handling the externality in speed choice, most countries rely on 
combinations of regulations (speed limits), enforcements (speeding tickets) and vehicle 
insurance schemes (bonus/malus constructions). Except for road-side policing, these 
instruments have a common shortcoming in their limited possibility to base rewards or 
punishments on actual driving behaviour. In particular, insurance schemes mainly reflect the 
cost of material (vehicle) damages caused by accidents, but not the cost of fatalities and 
injuries which usually is the major component of the external cost. Moreover, insurance 
premiums are differentiated between drivers only by broad characteristics, such as age, that 
are only weakly related to actual driving behaviour.
2 
 
However, new technologies, including positioning systems (such as the Global Positioning 
System GPS), mobile communications, and improvements of the information infrastructure 
(digital maps etc.) – often collectively referred to as Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) – 
now make observation of driving performance feasible. Several of these are already on the 
market, for instance to serve as navigation aids. 
 
The idea behind this paper is that, successfully engineered, ITS gadgets can be used for more 
than individual convenience. In particular, ITS can be made into an important tool for 
reducing accident risks. Using economic incentives in the form of diligently designed 
insurance schemes, it is furthermore feasible to create a market-led introduction of these 
technologies for safety purposes based on the standard Pareto principle that the free choice of 
individuals to purchase an item improves their welfare.  
 
The purpose of the paper is to report about two economic field experiments, based on the 
driver being remunerated for having and using the new equipment, in this way internalising 
                                                 
2 Parry (2004) compare alternative policies to reduce traffic accidents in the U.S. context, based on estimates of 
marginal external accident costs for different driver/vehicle categories. Among four compared policies he finds 
the most efficient being a differentiated mileage tax where each driver/vehicle category is charged a tax equal to 
its per-mile external cost. An insurance reform, changing premiums that are currently perceived on a lump-sum 
annual basis to a per-mile basis, is found to be inferior to this. Insurance premiums were assumed to vary in 
proportion to vehicle price and between three driver-age categories (below 25, 25-70, and above 70). The 
resulting premiums were found to be only loosely connected to external costs.   4
accident externalities relative to speed. Using the classification of Harrison & List (2004), we 
characterise our experiment as a framed field experiment. 
 
The first experiment has tested a policy where drivers have volunteered to install the 
equipment in return for a lump-sum (bonus) payment. With the equipment, information about 
going speed limits and about speeding is continuously provided to the driver, and this 
information may induce him or her to drive more carefully. The experiment shows that the 
offer of a bonus has a significant impact on the propensity to have the equipment installed. 
We argue that making this offer is a means to overcome an adverse selection problem; careful 
drivers opt for the equipment and get an insurance bonus while more frequent speeders don’t, 
and consequently have to pay more for their policy. 
 
The second experiment extends the use of the equipment, by using recorded data about actual 
driving and speeding as a basis for calculating the size of a bonus received for participating in 
the experiment: Volunteers get a (monthly) lump sum for participation, but the payment is 
reduced if the vehicle has been driven too fast. We show that linking payment to speeding has 
a significant effect on driving behaviour and argue that this is a means to deal with moral 
hazard aspects of driving. A real-world implementation would link the size of an insurance 
premium to the extent of speeding. 
  
After a brief review of some related literature in the next section, we start the presentation in 
section 3 by discussing the public good properties of speed choice. Section 4 describes the 
adverse selection, and section 5 the moral hazard experiment. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Previous literature 
Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA) is the generic name for systems in which the driver of a 
vehicle gets feedback on whether speed limits are exceeded; this is but one example of an 
Intelligent Transport System appliance. Carsten and Tate (2005) categorise ISA systems as 
Advisory, Voluntary (“Driver Select”) and Mandatory Systems, depending on how 
intervening it is.  
 
   5
 
Research projects and trials with ISA have been conducted in some European countries. The 
largest of these has been made in Sweden with several thousand ISA-equipped vehicles on the 
road, most with advisory systems that inform the driver about the going speed limit and 
provides a warning in case of speeding (Vägverket 2001). Based on UK trials, Carsten and 
Tate (2005) predict that a mandatory ISA system, preventing motorists from driving faster 
than speed limits and introduced in all road vehicles, would save 20 percent of injury 
accidents and 37 percent of fatal accidents in the United Kingdom. They also estimate a social 
benefit-cost ratio of such a program at between 8 and 15, depending on various 
circumstances.  
 
A mandatory system would be difficult to implement for numerous reasons. It requires 
political support at the national level and co-ordination at the international. Also, even if 
participation is mandatory, the willingness of individual drivers to comply is likely to be an 
important issue as there may be several more or less innovative ways of disconnecting or 
shutting down on-board ISA devices. 
 
In contrast, the present study focuses a voluntary ISA system, to which incentives for 
enrolment would be provided by a traffic insurance scheme that encourages instalment of 
such a system and/or compliance to the recommendations given by it. Our study is therefore 
related to the vast theoretical and empirical literature on optimal insurance schemes in an 
asymmetric information setting; see Dionne et al. (2000) for a generic model of adverse 
selection in insurance markets and Winter (2000) for a summary of the generic moral hazard 
model.  
 
There are a few studies within this literature that use experimental methods to study how the 
design of insurance schemes affects enrolment (adverse selection) and behaviour (hidden 
action). For instance, using a (hypothetical) choice questionnaire Royalty and Hagens (2005) 
investigate the effect of the out-of-pocket premium on the decision of employees in the U.S. 
to enrol in employer health insurance and other benefits plans.  
 
There is also a large literature within labour and public economics on the effects of social and 
private welfare programs on hidden action, such as the intensity of job search. Several studies 
take advantage of natural “quasi-experiment” design features of such programs. There are also   6
some field experiments based on classical experimental design. For instance, in the Maryland 
experiment (Klepinger et al. 2002) claimants to an unemployment insurance program were 
randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups, each representing a different work-search 
policy, or two control groups.  
 
Our paper makes use of field experiments as a wind tunnel for testing new ideas: Based on a 
crude theoretical basis, two simple mechanisms are tested in a real application. The results are 
interpreted as supportive of the possibility to use more targeted insurance schemes to deal 
with an important social dilemma, i.e. to induce people to take the full consequences of their 
behaviour into account. We are therefore now trying the more difficult task to approach 
governments and insurance companies with this new option. 
 
 
3. Under-provision of safety and the equipment as an impure public 
good 
Consider the utility function  i U of driver i. The travel time (t) for any given trip is a function 









Ui for alli. On the other hand, speed has an adverse effect on traffic safety ( i a ) for 
the driver due to an increased accident risk
3, as well as potentially more severe accident 










i for all i. 
Note that the details of  () s ai  may or may not vary with i, meaning that for any given speed 
' s ,  () ' s ai  may or may not differ from  ( ) ' s a j  for  j i ≠ ; we only require that c.p. changes of 
driver i’s speed affect driver i’s utility in the way stated above. It may or may not therefore be 
“objectively true” that some drivers can drive faster than others and still have an accident risk 
that is lower than the “typical” driver’s accident risk (i.e. are “exceptionally good drivers”). 
 
The travel time saved by higher speed is a private good and the thereby increased accident 
risk is a private bad, consequently leaving the sign of the derivate of  ( )( ) ( ) s a s t U i i , w i t h  
                                                 
3 Based on a review of several studies, Finch et al. (1994) estimate that accident risk is reduced by 3 percent for 
each 1 km/h reduction in average speed.    7






Ui . This also means that the “equilibrium speed” 
(s*) – the speed that a driver chooses – may differ across drivers; possibly 
) , , ( ) , , (
* *
j j j i i i U a t s U a t s ≠ .  
 
But accident risks and/or accident consequences are also a function of the speed of all the 














meaning that for all drivers i, a c.p. speed increase by any other driver decreases their utility.  
 
Suppose that an individual driver can purchase a technical deviced that assists in choosing a 
better informed travel speed for a cost of  d p and let  i y represent the monetary value of driver 
i’s accumulated remaining consumption. Individual i will purchase the device voluntarily 
only if 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , , 1 , , ,
* * * * * * = > = − − − d y S s a s t U d d p y S s a s t U i i i i i i i i , 
 
where  1 = d  ( 0 = d ) indicates that the device is (is not) purchased. s* and s** and  may 
differ, i.e. the “equilibrium speed” may be different if the equipment is or is not installed. 
Note that the subjective experience of infringement due to surveillance of the driving 
behaviour is captured by the conditioning statement in the utility expression above, and can be 
seen as being an inherent part of any driver’s utility function. 
 
The device is only purchased by those who consider the increased utility derived from it to be 
higher than the decreased utility due to non-consumption of other commodities of equal 
monetary value, i.e.  d p . These drivers can generally be characterized by having stronger 
preferences for traffic safety and/or lower utility associated to additional consumption of other 
commodities. The latter might be true for e.g. high-income individuals, but since this group 
can be expected to have a high value for travel time savings  ( ) s t  as well, it is by no means 
clear that the demand for the equipment will increase with income. 
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The aspect we focus on here is that individuals will not take the consequences of their choice 
of speed on others’ utility into account. Thus there is an obvious risk for under-provision of 
this impure public good. 
 
 
4. Field Experiment I: Luring Young Drivers into using In-Vehicle 
Electronic Equipment 
Over the 1999 – 2002 period, the owners of about 250 private cars and 150 commercial 
vehicles in Borlänge, a town in mid-Sweden, were part of a field test where they had their 
vehicles equipped with a small computer including a digital map, a GPS and a mobile com-
munication facility. The digital map comprised all roads in the area, both the municipality’s 
and the state roads. All existing speed-signs were meticulously registered and changes in 
speed regulations were updated with regular time intervals. An in-vehicle display continu-
ously informed the driver about the going speed limit, and an acoustic signal sounded if the 
vehicle was driven above the speed limit. The equipment was therefore basically a means for 
providing drivers with detailed information about whether or not they drove too fast. 
 
As part of the project, driving behaviour – i.e. the speed relative to the going speed limit –was 
being recorded every tenth second, and even more frequently if the vehicle was speeding. An 
ex post assessment of the Borlänge test and of similar tests in three other Swedish cities, 
undertaken by the funding agency, the Swedish National Road Administration, indicated that 
the equipment had resulted in a 7 percent reduction of average speed in the fleet of vehicles 
(Vägverket 2002). It is reason to question this number, primarily since there is poor data to 
contrast the trial period against. For the purpose of this paper, we will, however take as a 
datum that improved information about the vehicle’s speed relative to going speed limits, has 
a positive impact on driving behaviour. 
 
In this section, we describe a field experiment that sought to attract additional vehicle owners 
to the test crew. The means for doing so was to offer a sample of the target population an 
economic incentive for having the equipment installed. Section 4.1 motivates the interest in 
young drivers as the particular new test crew and presents the frame used for identifying the 
target population. Section 4.2 details the offer made, section 4.3 reports the result of our 
questionnaire and section 4.4 concludes.   9
 
 
4.1 Attracting New Users 
In 2002, several vehicles in the original test fleet had been sold or equipment had for other 
reasons been removed. The test fleet was considered too small, and since about 130 electronic 
platforms were available, a process to recruit new test drivers was initiated. In this, a point of 
departure was that the existing test crew, all of which had volunteered to participate back in 
1998, did not represent an average of vehicle owners. In particular, younger drivers were 
under represented, with no car-owner under the age of 30 in the group. 
 
Young drivers are of interest also for another reason. It appears to be a generally accepted 
proposition that young drivers are over represented in accident data in comparison to the size 
of the group.
4  This may be explained by sheer inexperience, but there is also reason to 
believe that youngsters drive faster than the speed limit more often than the population at 
large. For these and for other reasons, it is of interest to examine the possibility to affect the 
behaviour of this particular group of drivers.  
 
It was therefore decided that the target population for the present study was young drivers 
owning a car and living in the municipality of Borlänge. Our frame to obtain observational 
access was obtained from the Swedish Central Vehicle Registry that records all cars and their 
owners in the country. The addresses are updated regularly by retrieving information from the 
Swedish Register of the Total Population. Changes in car ownership are registered with a few 
days delay only. 
 
In August 2003, a list was compiled from the Vehicle Registry containing the names and 
addresses of all individuals of age 18 to 28 (inclusively
5) that had their main address in the 
municipality of Borlänge and was reported to own at least one car that was in active use in 
traffic. This frame is not perfect. First, some young drivers living in Borlänge and owning a 
car are not in the frame population. Most notably, temporarily visiting guest students from 
foreign countries, as well as Swedish students spending most of their time in Borlänge but 
still being registered under an address outside the municipality of Borlänge, are not contacted 
                                                 
4We have failed to find formal empirical proof of this proposition. 
5 The exact criterion was that the individuals must turn/have turned 18 at the latest during the year 2003 and 
must not turn/have turned 29 during that same year or any previous year.   10
in this way. We acknowledge this fact but are not very concerned about this under-coverage 
of the frame.  
 
Second, and of greater concern to us, is a possible over-coverage of the frame. Young drivers 
that have moved to one of the country’s larger cities may have an economic incentive to hold 
on to their Borlänge address. This is so since Borlänge may qualify them for lower insurance 
premiums than in many other cities, most notably for vehicle damage insurances. Young 
individuals that grew up, and still have their parents living in the municipality, but are e.g. 
studying in another city, may use this possibility. We expect these individuals to have their 
mail forwarded to their address of permanent residence. Many of them may view themselves 
as not belonging to our group of interest anymore and consequently ignore our invitation in a 
sort of “self-deselection”. Most typically this will not come to our attention, but will manifest 
itself as a non-response. 
 
Despite the fact that we can only observe “non-response” in general, it is important to 
distinguish between non-response due to the absence of interest in the speed-tracking device 
as such, and non-response due to “self-deselection” of an individual caused by discrepancy of 
official from real permanent residence. This is especially true when estimating the proportion 
of individuals prepared to consider an installation of the device. As we will see, ambiguity in 
the interpretation of the non-response can be an important factor when interpreting the result 
of our experiment. 
 
 
4.2 Proposal letter and selection of sub-groups 
The frame population contained 1,271 individuals and a letter of invitation was sent out to 
each of the associated addresses. Since the experiment sought to recruit only 130 individuals, 
and in order to avoid too many “yes” answers, only half the population were actually offered 
the equipment for installation. The other half of the target population received an offer that 
was identical in all respects except that the proposed question was only hypothetical. We will 
focus here on the group that received the real offer.   
 
The respondents receiving the factual offer were randomly selected from the individuals in the 
frame and allocated into two sub-groups before the contact letter was mailed. One of the   11
groups was asked to participate against receiving a monthly remuneration of SEK 150 (USD 
20) for the full year that the experiment would last. They would therefore earn SEK 1800, net 
of taxes (which the project would pay), with the only provision that the equipment was 
functional during the whole period. Payments were to be made monthly after checking for that 
driving behaviour had been logged and successfully transferred into the data base. The other 
group was invited to participate without any remuneration being paid. 
 
 
Table 1: Number of invitation letters. In parentheses the number sent out including those 
returned to sender due to unrecognized addressee. 
 Offering  device 
With remuneration  212 (213)
Without remuneration  421 (423)
Sum 633  (636)
 
 
The project was described on a single page. Except for one of the four questions described 
above, the letter also contained a four-page questionnaire regarding attitudes towards safety 
aspects of travelling. This questionnaire is not of immediate interest to us, but would allow for 




4.3 The response 
The 633 letters produced 264 answers, i.e. a response rate of 41.7 percent, see Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Results from the questionnaire.  
  With remuneration  Without remuneration  Sum 
Obtained yes  25 (11.8 percent) 19 (4.5 percent) 44 (6.9 percent) 
Obtained no  64 (30.2 percent) 156 (37.1 percent) 220 (34.8 percent) 
No response  123 (58.0 percent) 246 (58.4 percent) 369 (58.3 percent) 
Sum  212 (100 percent) 421 (100 percent) 633 (100 percent) 
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Table 2 shows that 11.5 percent in the group with remuneration
6 returned a yes-answer as 
opposed to only 4.5 percent in the group not offered remuneration. Viewing these proportions 
as two independent realisations in the two groups, one can apply a simple significance test for 
comparing two proportions (see e.g. Moore and McCabe 2003, p. 592). Testing the hypothesis 
of equality of proportions, against the alternative that the proportion of positive answers with 
remuneration is larger than without remuneration, gives a P-value as small as .0003. This 
strongly indicates that it is not reasonable to assume that the observed difference is explained 
by chance alone.
7 The remuneration can therefore be assumed to have had a substantial effect 
on the positive response of the young drivers, albeit many could still not be attracted by that 
particular remuneration. 
 
The simple significance test for comparing two proportions overlook a lot of structure in the 
problem, and our data contains much more information about the willingness of young drivers 
to have the device installed. First, non-response is generated by two circumstances, either by 
the failure to get in contact with a selected individual, or by a contacted individual's informed 
decision not to respond to the request. Second, it seems reasonable to assume that an 
individual that is willing to participate without monetary compensation also would be willing 
to participate with monetary compensation. Therefore, the obtained yes-answers from the 
group without remuneration do contain information that is relevant for the interpretation of the 
answers obtained from the group with remuneration. Likewise, is seems reasonable to assume 
that an individual which returns a negative answer when offered the monetary compensation 
would not have returned a positive answer when not offered the monetary compensation.  
 
This inherent structure can be directly modelled using contemporary statistical methodology. 
A separate paper by Thomas (2005) provides this analysis and shows the following 
(accounting for the structure in the problem as well as the ambiguity in the interpretation of 
non-response): between 6 and 12 percent of the population would be attracted to install the 
technical device in the absence of the remuneration whereas this proportion is between 10 and 
17 percent when the remuneration in fact is offered. The size of the group that can be induced 
                                                 
6 As it turned out, we were grossly mistaken in our estimate of the propensity to participate since the 25 aye’s 
was way off the target 130 participants. This did, however, not become a problem since the equipment started to 
malfunction at installation, forcing us to close down the whole project. The volunteered were paid off with a 
nominal amount of money and an excuse referring to first-generation techniques. 
7 The validity of this statement depends only on the exercised control over the experiment and does not depend 
on assumptions regarding to what extend the participating group of young drivers is representative for ‘all young 
drivers’.   13
to accept the device is about five percent of the population of young drivers. This group 
would not accept the device without remuneration but does so with the remuneration and is 





The reported field experiment demonstrates that economic incentives matter: An offer of a 
monthly remuneration of SEK 150 for having an information-producing device installed in 
their vehicles, affects the number of young drivers that accept the offer. An informed 
judgement is that the proportion of young drivers in a municipality like Borlänge that can be 
induced to install the device in the absence of remuneration is close to 9 percent. Since around 
14 percent seem to be willing to take measures to qualify if the potential reward is in parity 
with our compensation, we expect that the effect of the scheme is to increase the participation 
with around 5 percent of the relevant population. 
 
For several reasons, subsidy schemes may be difficult to use in real-world applications. The 
experience from the present field experience can however readily be transferred into current 
practices in the insurance industry. Let us first note that vehicle insurance policies typically 
are differentiated across customer groups. In particular, people with new driving licenses, and 
those that have recently been involved in accidents, typically pay a higher premium than 
experienced drivers with no accident record. This is a way for companies to handle adverse 
selection by proxy. Rather that calculating charges that immediately link to observed 
behaviour – which at present is difficult or at least costly – the premium differentiation seeks 
to pinpoint insurance holders that are on average believed to be a higher risk. 
 
The novel ITS technology however provides a means for identifying more or less careful 
drivers. A small group of vehicle users are technique nerds or are very keen on safety aspects 
of their driving and would anyway buy the equipment. An economic reward can lure an 
additional number of vehicle owners into having the device installed. Evidence from the 
Swedish experiments moreover indicates that the equipment per se may induce the owner to 
drive more carefully. If the community of equipment users drive more carefully than the 
average drivers do, they will by definition be better customers for the insurance company. The   14
device can therefore serve as a proxy for careful drivers, and these can be remunerated by a 
lower insurance premium. It is reason to believe that women and the elderly will be over 
represented in this group. 
 
The others, i.e. vehicle owners that don’t have the device installed, will by definition include a 
higher share of high-risk drivers, which will press the premiums upwards in this sub-group. 
The combination of whip (a higher premium for some) and carrot (a lower for others), and the 
possibility to self select into the low-premium scheme, may work to separate the market. 
 
Insurance companies may be reluctant to start using these sophisticated premium schemes. 
Reasons include substantial administration costs and that insurance cost differences across 
sub-categories of drivers may be too small to induce entry into the subsidy scheme. It should 
be noted that the incentive used in the above experiment after all was fairly high and still 
attracted a fairly small share of the population.  
 
The analysis in section 2 however pointed to the prisoners’ dilemma aspects of the choice of 
speed, i.e. that drivers don’t account of the risk to others of speeding. This implies a motive 
for government intervention. One way of doing is to link the use of ITS equipment and a 
differentiated insurance policy, to a complementary differentiation of the annual vehicle tax. 
Vehicle owners that (presumably) are more careful drivers than others would not only have to 
pay a lower insurance premium, but also have their vehicle tax reduced. For a balanced 
budget, the tax for other vehicles would have to be raised. Insurance companies can in this 
way be made agents for the government, and the industry could possibly also be allowed to 




5. Field Experiment II: Intelligent Economic Speed Adaptation
8 
One shortcoming of the above experiment, and of the real-world application that has been 
drafted, is that the mere presence of the equipment in cars does not guarantee that drivers 
actually drive more cautiously. A second field experiment has therefore studied the 
behavioural consequences of directly linking the size of a payment to experimental subjects to 
                                                 
8 This section is based on Hultkrantz & Lindberg (2004).   15
their actual behaviour, i.e. to the extent of speeding.
9 We will argue that this is an alternative, 
or possibly complementary, way to use economic incentives. This time, it is not a certain type 
of vehicle owner, but the actual behaviour that is remunerated i.e. the moral hazard dimension 
of the insurer-ensured relationship is in focus. The experimental design of our second field 
experiment is presented in section 5.1., results for two sub-groups of the population in 
sections 5.2 and 5.3 and section 5.4 sums up. 
 
 
5.1 Experimental design 
In May 2002, 114 car owners that remained from the original field test were invited to 
participate in a complementary economic experiment during September and October that 
year.
10 The experiment budget would pay a monthly lump-sum bonus for participation. The 
bonus would, however, be reduced for each minute a vehicle drove faster than the speed limit. 
The purpose of the field experiment was to assess the consequences of this “speeding penalty” 
for actual driving behaviour.  
 
A majority of the remaining test crew (95 persons out of 114) accepted to participate, while 9 
rejected and 10 drivers did not respond. An ex post comparison of participants and non-
participants shows that there is a self-selection bias in the recruitment to our experiment, in 
addition to the original bias in recruiting participants. Our test crew is on average older than 
the non-participants and have less severe speed violations.  
 
An important pre-condition for the result analysis is the seasonal variation in driving 
behaviour due to climate variations. Under winter conditions, which usually begin in late 
October or in November and last until March or April, drivers typically reduce their speed. 
Our experiment, however, benefited from the observations of driving behaviour that had been 
collected during previous years. The impact of speed violation charges is therefore evaluated 
by comparing behaviour of each driver when economic incentives are in force with the same 
driver’s behaviour during the same month one year earlier. 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that this experiment was performed one year before the experiment presented above, but is 
presented here for the sake of clarity in exposition. 
10 The group of drivers filtered out in this process are in no way a representative sample of car owners. The test 
group is likely to be highly motivated because of an interest in the technology, a preference for safe driving, 
desire to assist research, or whatever. The question for our experiment, hence, is how the driving behaviour of 
such highly motivated individuals changes when economic incentives are added.   16
 
Economic parameter values were systematically varied in order to assess their relative 
importance. First, participants were randomly assigned to a low or high bonus group (250 or 
500 SEK/month).
11 Second, since the accident risk increases progressively with the speed of 
the car, the bonus reduction was made progressive. The cost for driving up to 10 percent 
above the speed limit for the low-bonus groups was 0.10 SEK/minute (TYPE I speeding), 
0.25 SEK/minute for driving 11-20 percent above speed limits (TYPE II) and 1.00 
SEK/minute for speed offences higher than 20 percent (TYPE III). Third, a double speeding 
penalty, i.e. 0.20, 0.50 and 2.00 SEK/minute in the respective groups, was also enacted. 
Fourth, a control group was created that were paid the respective bonus but faced no 
deductions for speeding. Table 3 summarises the six treatments.  
 
 
Table 3: Treatment groups i-vi (no. of individuals in the group). 
 Deduction  when  speeding 
Base bonus  0  Low  High 
250 SEK  i (15)  iii (16)  v (16) 
500 SEK  ii (16)  iv (16)  vi (16) 
  
 
In addition to this premeditated setting of treatments, the refusal of 14 individuals to 
participate provides us with an extra reference group. Since the non-participants still were part 
of the overall test and therefore had their driving behaviour monitored, it was ex post feasible 
to contrast the behaviour of those that have and have not joined forces with the economic 
experiment.  
 
Figure 1 and Table 4 describes the nature of the information used for assessing the 
consequences of the economic incentives. Figure 1 presents the speed of car number 58, a 
driver with low bonus/low deduction, using roads with speed limit 50 km/h in September 
2001 and September 2002. A corresponding summary was made for all classes of speed 
limits. Frequency here refers to the share of total time driven at this speed. Eyeballing the 
figure, it is obvious that the incentive scheme has shifted the driving behaviour to the left, i.e. 
the proportion of time driven above the speed limit has been reduced. At the end of each 
                                                 
11 After having randomised participants it was checked that the observed driving behaviour in September 2001 
did not differ systematically across treatment groups.   17
month, participants received information about their speed behaviour, the sum of charges and 
remaining bonus in the way illustrated by Table 4.  
 
 
Figure 1  Speed profile of car #58 on roads with speed limit 50 km/h September 2001 (no 
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Table 4: Information provided to the owner of car # 58, September 2002 about no. of minutes 
speeding in each class of speed violations and consequent speed charges. 














0percent to 10percent 
above speed limit 
0 3 0 0 0  0,20  kr  ,60 kr
11percent to 20percent 
above speed limit 
0 0 0 0 0  1,00  kr  ,00 kr
Above 21percent above 
speed limit 
0 0 0 0 0  2,00  kr  ,00 kr
Total  0 min  3 min  0 min  0 min  0 min    ,60 kr
 
Fixed monthly payment for the period:  250 SEK 
Deduction (rounded):  1 SEK 
Payment (net before tax):  249 SEK 
This payment will be transferred to your bank account. In addition, VTI has paid preliminary 
income tax directly to the Tax authority on your account with:  107 SEK 
 
 
A relative measure of speed violation (PVM – Proportion Violation Minutes) is calculated for 
each individual (j) as the time the driver violates the speed limit for each type (severity class) 






PVM =       (1) 
i = Type I, Type II or Type III 
j= individual 1…114. 
 
PVM will differ across individuals due to non-observable individual characteristics, but the 
focus here is on the difference in behaviour over time on an individual level. The absolute 
adaptation is the difference in Proportional Violation Minutes prior to, and as a result of the 
experiment for each violation type (equation 2).  
 
2001 2002
ji ji ji PVM PVM PVM − = Δ      (2) 
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5.2 Results: Adaptation of participants compared to non-participants 
A first step in the analysis of how economic incentives affect behaviour is to compare the 95 
individuals that opted to participate with the 14 persons that did not. The dataset is restricted 
to individuals where we have observations from both 2001 and 2002. Figure 2 shows that 
non-participants drive too fast about 17 percent of the time in 2001 and tend to have the same 
driving pattern in 2002. Participants drive too fast about 14 percent of the time in 2001, but 
the extent of speeding drops to about 8 percent in 2002. Obviously, the participation in the 
experiment has reduced the proportion of speed violations. Table 5 demonstrates that the 
difference in absolute adaptation between participants and non-participants is significant for 
all violation types except for the severest violations in October.  
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Table 5: Absolute speed adaptation between 2002 and 2001. 
GROUP Participants  Non-participants Difference 
  Mean  Std  dev Obs Mean Stddev Obs Mean Std  dev t-value 
September – September                 
ΔPVM  All  -0.05  0.07  72 0.01 0.04  10 0.06 0.07  2.712
** 
ΔPVM  I  -0.03  0.06  72 0.01 0.04  10 0.04 0.06  2.111
** 
ΔPVM  II  -0.01  0.02  72 0.00 0.01  10 0.01 0.02  2.230
** 
ΔPVM  III  -0.01  0.01  72 0.00 0.01  10 0.01 0.01  2.816
** 
October  -  October               
ΔPVM  All  -0.06  0.06  44 0.00 0.04  6  0.06 0.06  2.448
** 
ΔPVM I  -0.04  0.04  44  -0.01  0.02  6  0.03  0.04  2.098
** 
ΔPVM  II  -0.01  0.02  44 0.00 0.01  6  0.02 0.02  2.246
** 
ΔPVM  III  -0.01  0.02  44 0.00 0.02  6  0.01 0.02  1.324 
*) Significant on 90percent level, **) Significant on 95percent level. 
 
 
5.3 Results: Adaptation within the group of participants 
Figure 3 provides an overview over the observations for October, both for the 14 non-
participators and for the 95 volunteers. Four treatment groups (64 drivers) had a speed related 
penalty (se table 3 above) while two groups (31 drivers) had no penalty but did receive a 
lump-sum for participating (zero-price). As indicated by Table 6 (below) we have fewer 
observations than so, due to malfunctioning equipment. The number of observations in some 
groups provides one reason for the problem to obtain significant differences between groups. 
 
Both the groups with and without penalties reduced the proportion of speed violations during 
the experiment months compared to the same months previous year. The four treatment 
groups with speeding penalties violated the speed limit 15 percent of their driving time prior 
to the experiment and 7 to 9 percent during the experiment. The zero-priced group had a 
violation of 11 to 12 percent prior to, and 7 to 8 percent during the experiment. 
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Figure 3: Relative adaptation October 2002 compared with October 2001. No= non-
participants. Zero – groups i+ii; priced – groups iii-vi; low B – groups iii+iv; high B – groups 
v+vi; Low P – groups iii+v; High P – groups iv+vi.  
 
 
The formal test of significant differences in Table 6, indicates that there is a (weak) difference 
in adaptation during October but not in September. This can probably be explained by a 
learning effect. During the first month of the experiment, several no-penalty drivers contacted 
the project secretariat and asked if the zero price really was correct. This group may therefore 
have changed behaviour as a result of receiving a lump-sum bonus, but after the feed-back 
month they realised that the non-penalty was accurate and behaved accordingly, i.e. did not let 
the economic experiment affect their behaviour. 
 
The table also indicates that it is only the difference in adaptation for the more severe 
violations (PVM 2 and PVM 3) that are significant. As expected, we find the strongest 
reaction in the more severe violations with the highest price per minute. But a reduction in 
severe violations means that the whole driving pattern is “pushed downwards”. Type I 
violations may therefore remain un-changed relative to the comparison period, simply 
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Table 6: Speed Adaptation between 2002 and 2001. Comparison of participants with and 
without penalty. 
GROUP Penalty  No  penalty  Difference 
  Mean  Std  dev Obs Mean Stddev Obs Mean Std  dev t-value 
September – September                 
ΔPVM All  -0.06  0.08  49  -0.04  0.06  23  0.02  0.07  0.851 
ΔPVM I  -0.04  0.06  49  -0.03  0.04  23  0.01  0.06  0.687 
ΔPVM II  -0.01  0.02  49  -0.01  0.02  23  0.00  0.02  0.905 
ΔPVM III  -0.01  0.01  49  -0.01  0.01  23  0.00  0.01  0.537 
October  -  October               
ΔPVM All  -0.07  0.05  30  -0.04  0.06  14  0.03  0.06  1.816
* 
ΔPVM I  -0.04  0.04  30  -0.04  0.03  14  0.01  0.04  0.592 
ΔPVM  II  -0.02  0.02  30 0.00 0.02  14 0.02 0.02  2.681
** 
ΔPVM  III  -0.01  0.02  30 0.00 0.02  14 0.01 0.02  1.991
* 





Penalties that reduce the size of a bonus payment when vehicles are speeding have a 
significant effect on driving behaviour. We have shown this by comparing individuals that 
have participated in the experiment with those that opted out. Participants have significantly 
reduced their frequency of speeding when risking lower bonus payments. A similar, while not 
equally significant difference can be seen when we compare different ways to treat 
participants. Across bonus levels (high and low), and across different levels of penalty 
deductions, drivers that receive no penalty change their behaviour less than those that face 
speeding penalties. Moreover, penalties bite in particular for drivers that receive a low bonus 
for participating, presumably since the penalty then is a larger share of the base-line bonus 
payment. 
 
We have demonstrated that the 14 non-participants, i.e. those that did not want to participate 
in the economic experiment, had a manifest behaviour different than the 95 participants; they 
drive faster. This provides an indication of the importance of self-selection bias, i.e. that it is   23
no chance that drivers differ in their propensity to accept offers of participation bonuses that 
on the face of it should be considered as beneficial; legal driving is remunerated with 250 or 
500 SEK per month. 
 
It should also be reiterated that our test crew is a far way from an average driver. First, a 
(random) sample of Borlänge citizen were invited to have the ITS equipment installed back in 
1998. Secondly, those that joined in are presumably more interested in issues related to 
accident risks or whatever than the average. It is also reasonable to expect that the volunteers 
are more careful drivers than overall, since they would otherwise have had to listen to the 
annoying alarm pretty often. And third, the volunteers to our complementary moral hazard 
experiment represent a group of more careful drivers than the average. Our results indicate 





The technical development in the telecom-, computer and vehicle industries has progressed at 
impressing speed over the last decade. But to the surprise of many, the ITS technology has not 
been implemented in the transport sector to the extent expected. While electronic in-vehicle 
maps have been available for many years, the demand for such services is still low. The cost 
of the equipment, and the bonus services it provides, seems to be high relative to the price of a 
traditional map stored in the glove compartment. 
 
The present paper has reported about two field experiments indicating that electronic in-
vehicle equipment may have a potential use as a means for controlling one of the main 
determinants of motor vehicle accidents, i.e. the frequency of speeding. The possibility to 
track and register behaviour in a way which has not previously been feasible, together with 
elaborate economic incentive schemes, may open up for new ways to increase traffic safety. 
Since the type of ITS-based equipment that we have in mind is an (impure) public good that 
may otherwise be under-supplied, government intervention is required.  
 
Like many new techniques, our suggestions for using the equipment to handle adverse 
selection and/or moral hazard types of problems, is fraught with problems. One is that it is   24
merely a first shot at an institutional setting. A second is that the interest from the insurance 
industry most probably is restricted by the propensity of individuals to respond to incentives. 
If only few drivers use the new equipment and benefit from lower insurance premiums, the 
administrative costs may be too high to warrant the additional complication that the scheme 
would imply. It is obvious that close cooperation between insurance companies and 
government representatives in order to capture the public-good qualities of the problems, is a 
prerequisite for further success. Also car-makers and the telecom industry have an obvious 
stake in the matter. 
 
A third issue, and presumably the most contentious, is the big-brother aspect of the technique. 
The sort of equipment we have in mind will make it feasible to monitor the behaviour of 
individual vehicles, thereby obviously intruding on privacy. A first answer to this problem is 
that most parts of the technique are already in use in many taxis and heavy vehicles and that 
other, more sophisticated versions of it are currently being tested.
12 A second repost is the 
self-selection trick that is suggested: All insurance holders are invited to participate. But it is 
only those that volunteer that run the risk of being recorded.
13 And volunteers are by their 
nature less concerned with the big-brother aspects of the problem.  
 
We have also anticipated that volunteers are more careful drivers than average; since they 
don’t really have to change their behaviour so much, it is easy for them to acquire the 
equipment and save on the insurance premium. In one way, this group is of secondary interest 
with respect to safety since they already are (relatively) law abiding and therefore less 
accident-prone. But the self-selection into the scheme will push up insurance charges for non-
participants, meaning a better fit of accident risks and -costs to actual (dangerous) behaviour. 
 
The ITS technique most probably also holds promise for other applications in the road sector. 
One obvious example is the growing interest in congestion pricing. The London version of 
levying fees is still a crude manual scheme. The potential for elaborate and detailed traffic 
control by way of in-vehicle devices of the sort tested here, providing extensive social 
                                                 
12 Indeed, some insurance companies have started to explore the possibility to have an ‘usage-based insurance 
rating system’. Progressive, in USA, has tried with a system called Autograph, which bases the insurance rates 
on how much, when and where the vehicle is driven’ (www.progressive.com) and a similar pay-as-you-drive 
system is being tested in Britain (www.norwichunion.com/pay-as-you-drive/index.htm). 
13 An open legal issue is whether records could be used as evidence in a prosecution of the driver after an 
accident. In the field trials reported here, a contract was signed that declared that the individual records   25
benefits, may therefore be considerable (Hultkrantz 2004). This is, however, nothing that can 
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